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T

he economic policies of China and India are enormously important, not only to the
citizens of these two populous countries but increasingly to the vitality of the global
economy. Both countries have abandoned Soviet-style central planning and are now
decentralizing economic decision making by pursuing market-oriented reforms and
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devolving fiscal functions to local governments. In 1994, China reformed its tax system by
assigning taxes to the central government and creating a national tax administration to
collect taxes assigned to the central government. In contrast, in 1991, India tried to
revitalize its economy by deregulating its economy and, in 1992, further decentralizing its
fiscal system from state to local governments.
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the design and performance of China
and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. We pay particular attention to the fiscal
effects of changes to their respective intergovernmental systems. Performance is measured
by the overall and average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization and the
interregional variation in the average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization. To this
end, we make use of a unique dataset on the fiscal operations of the central and sub-national
governments of both countries for the period 1985 through 2005. Our comparative analysis
seeks to identify strengths and weaknesses in China and India’s fiscal systems. To the best
of our knowledge, no quantitative comparison of China and India’s fiscal systems has been
undertaken so far, making this study the first of its kind.1
There is a large theoretical literature describing the advantages of fiscal decentralization. In
his seminal article, Tiebout (1956) shows that many competing jurisdictions seeking to
attract residents and a mobile population ready to move to the jurisdiction offering the best
tax-expenditure bundle can lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the local public
sector. Oates (1972) contends that, in the absence of scale economies and interjurisdictional spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods is always superior in
terms of economic efficiency to centralized and therefore uniform provision of local public
goods.
According to Buchanan (1976), differences in the benefits and costs of providing
government services—henceforth net fiscal residuals—across regions may induce migration
from regions with low net fiscal residuals to regions with high net fiscal residuals. As
people move in response to differences in net fiscal residuals, the cost of providing a
constant level of local public goods increases due to increased congestion of local public
goods, and, as people leave regions with low net fiscal residuals, the cost of providing a
constant level of local public goods decreases due to decreased congestion of local public
goods. Thus, in Buchanan’s model, differences in net fiscal residuals among the regions of
a country induce migration which, in turn, eliminates interregional differences in net fiscal
residuals. In equilibrium, there is no incentive for people to move from one region to
another.
One potential drawback of the Tiebout-Oates-Buchanan model of fiscal decentralization,
particularly in the context of China and India, is the assumption of a highly mobile
population moving in response to differences in net fiscal residuals among regions of a
1 There are a number of studies providing comparative descriptions of China and India’s fiscal
systems. See, for example, Rao (2003), Martinez‐Vazquez and Rider (2006), and Singh (2007).
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country. This assumption applies to very few countries. It certainly does not apply to
traditional societies, like those of China and India, where people have strong attachments to
particular localities due to local customs, local languages, and ethnic fractionalization. In
such circumstances, elimination of net fiscal residuals among the regions of a country with
relatively immobile populations can only be achieved by purposeful central government
policies to transfer resources to local governments. In the absence of intergovernmental
equalization transfers, large interregional discrepancies can emerge in the quantity and
quality of local government service provision. The risk is that growing fiscal disparities can
jeopardize social cohesion and political stability.
Indeed, there is concern that growing interregional disparities within both countries are
weakening national cohesion and solidarity. Spahn (2007) points out that achieving social
cohesion and a sense of national identity is particularly challenging in these two large
countries. Political unrest and regional separatist tendencies are on-going concerns.
Consequently, there is a need for centripetal policies, such as equalizing transfers, to help
address the concerns of aggrieved ethno-linguistic minorities and other potential
secessionists.
Another potential drawback of the Tiebout-Oates-Buchanan model is that it is too
simplistic. In their model, many jurisdictions competing for residents and a mobile
population willing to move in response to differences in net fiscal residuals is sufficient to
achieve allocative efficiency in the public sector. In other words, “voting with your feet”
serves as an accountability mechanism that assures fiscal discipline and efficient resource
allocation by local governments. However, in mature federal countries, there are multiple
accountability mechanisms that promote efficiency and fiscal discipline among local
governments. One such accountability mechanism is popularly elected local government
officials. If the residents of a jurisdiction are unhappy with the performance of their local
government, they can vote the “bums out.” In fact, Stigler (1957) contends that
representative democracy works best when government is closest to the people. In his view
fiscal decentralization strengthens the democratic process. However, voting as an
accountability mechanism works best when there are competing political parties, and people
vote according to their interests rather than strictly according to ethnic or caste affiliations.
Another important accountability mechanism is allowing local governments to go to the
market to borrow the necessary funds to finance capital expenditures. A local government
that is living within its means is able to borrow at lower costs than a local government that
is living beyond its means. Thus, the quest for high bond ratings and thus lower interest
payments on local debt obligations creates strong financial incentives for local governments
to achieve and maintain fiscal discipline. Finally, the rule of law, an independent judiciary,
and a vibrant civil society, particularly freedom of the press, are also important
accountability mechanisms in mature democracies.
Even with all of these accountability mechanisms in place, however, there is still significant
waste, fraud, and inefficiency among local governments in many mature federal countries.
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One only has to look at the substandard performance of public schools in the United States
to realize that a federal system with an array of accountability mechanisms does not ensure
efficient resource allocation in the public sector.2
Since many of these accountability mechanisms are missing in China and India, they must
rely on vertical accountability mechanisms, like audits. However, vertical accountability
mechanisms often are vulnerable to political manipulation. Thus, to gauge the performance
of a given fiscal system, it is important to look not only at its design but also to look at
empirical measures of its performance.
We find that there are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and
India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. More specifically, compared to the international
average, both countries have highly decentralized expenditure assignments and fairly
centralized revenue assignments, making local governments reliant on central government
transfers to finance their responsibilities. In addition, sub-national governments in both
countries engage in off-the-books and hidden borrowing. We also find that there are
considerable and growing disparities in the rates of expenditure decentralization among
sub-national governments within both countries. Lack of fiscal discipline and growing fiscal
disparities among sub-national governments create risks to future economic growth and to
social cohesion, in the absence of policy reforms to address these issues.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes China and
India’s fiscal systems. Section 3 discusses the performance of their respective systems, and
section 4 concludes.
A Description of China and India’s Fiscal Systems
A convenient way to organize the following discussion of China and India’s fiscal systems
is to describe the pillars of their intergovernmental fiscal systems, namely the expenditure
assignments, revenue assignments, system of intergovernmental transfers, and regulation of
subnational borrowing. We proceed below by describing the pillars of China’s fiscal
system, with special emphasis on the 1994 tax sharing system (TSS) reforms (fenshui zhi).3
We also briefly explain China’s system of extra-budgetary finance. Then, we turn to a
description of the pillars of India’s fiscal system, with a special focus on the 1992
constitutional amendments.

There is an extensive literature on high expenditures per pupil and poor performance of
America’s public school students in international rankings. See, for example, Papham (2004).

2

3 The 1994 reform of the tax sharing system centralized tax revenue collections and introduced the
current system of intergovernmental transfers.
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China’s fiscal system
China is a unitary country with five hierarchically arranged levels of government,
comprised of one central government; 34 provincial level governments, including 22
provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities directly under the central
government, and two special administrative regions, namely Hong Kong after 1997, Macao
after 1999, and the claimed province of Taiwan. There are about 333 prefectures, including
autonomous prefectures and cities divided into districts; 2,856 counties, including
autonomous counties, small cities not divided into districts, districts within large cities; and
40,906 townships.
The recent evolution of China’s fiscal system has been a gradual movement in the direction
of greater fiscal decentralization. In 1978, fiscal reforms started with the devolution of
resources and decision-making power to sub-national governments and state owned
enterprises (SOEs). Although these initiatives provided sub-national governments with
incentives to develop their local economies, the uncontrolled decentralization and case-bycase bargaining between the central and sub-national governments led to a sharp decline in
central government revenues.
Figure 1 (China): The Share of Consolidated General Government Revenue in GDP,
and the Share of Central Government Revenue in Consolidated Revenues, 1985-2006

Source: National Statistics Bureau, China
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More specifically, as shown in Figure 1, consolidated government revenues dropped from
slightly more than 20 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to approximately 10
percent of GDP, between 1985 and 1993. Meanwhile, the central government’s share of
revenues dropped from 38.4 percent of consolidated revenues to 22 percent. These trends
were the result of the proliferation of tax exemptions granted to local state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and the shifting of taxes by sub-national governments from budgetary to
extra-budgetary accounts. Prior to the 1994 TSS reforms, local governments collected the
major share of domestic taxes, and transferred the central government’s share of local taxes
to the central government. By moving revenues off-budget, local governments were able to
retain a greater share of local revenues. As discussed in greater detail below, the decline in
the two-ratios – the decline in consolidated revenues as a share of GDP and the decline in
the central government’s share of consolidated government revenues - led the central
government to initiate the 1994 TSS reforms with a view to re-centralize revenues.
The first pillar: China’s expenditure assignments
Table 1 summarizes China’s current expenditure assignments. Many expenditure
responsibilities are shared by the central government and sub-national governments,
including social security, education, medical services, public health, and economic
development. Although statutorily China’s expenditure assignments involve extensive
concurrent expenditure responsibilities, sub-national governments accounted for more than
74 percent of consolidated expenditures in 2005 as opposed to 47.5 percent in 1984. The
system of expenditure assignments is on the whole unchanged since the initiation of
economic reforms in 1978. A heavy burden of providing basic public services rests largely
on sub-national governments. More specifically, 98 percent of health expenditures were
shouldered by sub-national governments in 2007. Furthermore, the politically centralized
system makes it easy for the central government to shift expenditures to sub-national
governments, although, as we will see below, major revenues have been recentralized since
enactment of the 1994 TSS reforms.
The second pillar: China’s revenue assignments
As summarized in Table 2, the central government is assigned the major share of the broadbased and productive taxes. Taxes exclusively assigned to sub-national governments are
low-yielding taxes, such as slaughter taxes. Meanwhile, the 1994 TSS reforms divided tax
administration into two systems: the National Tax Service (NTS) and the Local Tax Service
(LTS). The NTS is responsible for the collection of exclusively central taxes and all shared
taxes. The LTS collects exclusively local taxes. As a result of this clear-cut division of
responsibility, sub-national governments are no longer able to conceal local resources in
extra-budgetary accounts.
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Table 1: Statutory Expenditure Assignments, 1993 and 2007 (percent)
1993
Assignment of
function

Exclusive
responsibility of the
central government

Exclusive
responsibility of subnational governments

Concurrent
responsibility

Main Responsibilities
central

2007

subnational

central

subnational

National defense

100

0

100

0

Foreign affairs, aid and debt service

100

0

100

0

International trade policies

100

0

100

0

National fiscal and monetary policies

100

0

100

0

National infrastructure

100

0

100

0

Operation of the central government and
central judicial organs

100

0

100

0

National projects

100

0

100

0

Technical renovation, research and
development by central SOEs

100

0

100

0

Macroeconomic control, coordination
among regions, redistribution like transfers
among regions

100

0

100

0

Local parks, recreation, fire safety and
other local public services

0

100

0

100

Sub-national projects, infrastructure and
housing

0

100

0

100

Technical renovation, research and
development by sub-national SOEs

0

100

0

100

Operation of sub-national governments and
sub-national judicial organs

0

100

0

100

Sub-national water, power, sewage, waste
disposal and welfare

0

100

0

100

Expenses on economic development such
as capital investment and accumulation

69

31

69

31

Education and culture

11

89

7

93

Public health and sanitation

49

51

2

98

Science and technology

33

67

52

48

Social security such as pensions and
unemployment insurance

1

99

6

94

Subsidies on agriculture and others

10

90

9

91

Public security

25

75

17

83

32

68

34

66

8

92

25

75

100

0

94

6

Expenditures on industry, transportation
and commerce including environmental
protection, urban maintenance and
construction
Administration expenses
Interest payments on debts

Source: Jin (2009, p. 64).
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Table 2: China’s Statutory Revenue Assignments, 1993 and 2007 (percent)
1993

Assignment
of functions
Exclusively
assigned to
the central
government

Exclusively
assigned to
sub-national
governments

Shared taxes

Actual tax
shares

Main Revenues

2007

central

sub-national

central

sub-national

Customs duties
Value added taxes and excise taxes on
imports
Tax reimbursements for export of foreign
trade businesses
Urban maintenance & construction taxes
(other than from railways corporations,
banks, & non-bank financial institutions like
insurance businesses)
Vehicle and vessel sales, use taxes

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

Profit remittances from sub-national SOEs
Real estate taxes in urban and township areas
and land use-related taxes
Stamp taxes other than those on security

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

Deed taxes
Fixed asset investment regulation taxes
(suspended in 2000)
Banquet taxes (mostly abolished in 2002)

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

0

100

n.a.

n.a.

Agricultural taxes (abolished in 2005)
Slaughter taxes (abolished in 2006)
Value Added Taxes (VAT)
Product / Excise taxes
Corporate Income Taxes (CIT)
Personal Income Taxes (PIT)
Business taxes
Stamp taxes on security transaction
Agricultural sector taxes
Other taxes
Tax revenues
Non-tax revenues
Total revenues

0
0
12
57
78
0
8
50
8
n.a.
21
98
33

100
100
88
43
22
100
92
50
92
n.a.
79
2
67

n.a.
n.a.
75
100
64
60
3
97
97
20
58
24
54

n.a.
n.a.
25
0
36
40
97
3
3
80
42
76
46

Source: Jin (2009, p. 63).
Notes:
(1) CIT in 1993 refers to SOEs only.
(2) The product taxes were replaced by excise taxes/consumption tax in 1994.
(3) Taxes on the agricultural sector include husbandry tax, contract tax, special agricultural product taxes,
arable land use tax and other agriculture-related taxes and charges.

The three bottom rows of Table 2 show actual tax and non-tax revenue shares in total
revenues by level of government before and after the TSS reforms. In 1993, before the TSS
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reforms, the share of sub-national tax revenues in total revenues was 79 percent, with the
remaining 21 percent of revenue accruing to the central government. However, in 2007, the
situation was reversed: the central government share of total revenues was 58 percent, with
the remaining 42 percent accruing to sub-national governments. This re-centralization of
revenues is mainly the result of the 1994 TSS reforms. As a result, the percentage of shared
tax revenues in consolidated tax revenues increased from 55 percent in 1994 to 70 percent
in 2005. As a result of the 1994 TSS reforms, the previously poor inland provinces became
even worse off in terms of revenue capacity because their limited own revenues were
centralized. This revenue centralization makes them even more dependent on central
transfers as well as on hidden sub-national borrowings.
In the case of China, there exists another critical source of finance. That is off-budget
finance, which exists at both the central and sub-national levels of government. Off-budget
finance consists mainly of extra-budgetary funds together with user fees and various levies.
Off-budget finance by sub-national governments is under the full discretion of sub-national
governments. The size of extra-budgetary funds grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s,
finally becoming equivalent in size to budgetary funds in 1991.4 As a result of several
policy reforms associated with the 1994 TSS reforms, which shifted extra-budgetary funds
to budgetary funds, extra-budgetary funds began to decline.5 In 2005, extra-budgetary
expenditures dropped to about 16 percent of budgetary expenditures. Since the taxes
associated with off-budget funds are levied on the same tax base as budget funds, offbudget funds, like extra-budgetary revenues, are positively related to own source revenues,
which is an important source of interregional disparities in per capita provincial
expenditures.6
The third pillar: China’s system of intergovernmental transfers
A fiscal system, like China’s, with highly centralized revenues and highly decentralized
expenditures makes sub-national governments dependent on intergovernmental transfers to
fill the gap between their expenditure responsibilities and revenue capacity. In 2005,
transfers from the central government to sub-national governments accounted for 57 percent
of total central government expenditures and 46 percent of sub-national revenues, including
extra-budget accounts.
The current transfer system was introduced in China by the 1994 TSS reforms. There are
three types of central government transfers to sub-national governments: tax rebates,
general-purpose grants, and special-purpose grants. Tax rebates are distributed on a
derivation basis to address the political opposition of high-income sub-national
4

See Wong (1998) for the size evolution and detailed categories of off‐budget funds.

5

See, for example, State Council Document No. 29 (1996).

6 See, for example, Wong (1998) for detailed empirical investigation of extra‐budgetary funds, and
Zuo (1996) for a discussion of local levies.
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governments to the TSS reforms. Accordingly, tax rebates conflict with the equalization
goal of the TSS reforms. To achieve greater horizontal fiscal equalization, the share of tax
rebates was decreased from 75 percent in 1994 to 19 percent in 2008; whereas the share of
general purpose grants increased from 4 to 38 percent during the same period. Specialpurpose grants compromise a third type of intergovernmental transfer and are intended to
realize specific objectives of the central government. The share of special-purpose grants in
total transfers also increased from 21 percent in 1994 to 43 percent in 2008.
The fourth pillar: China’s regulation of sub-national borrowing autonomy
Although sub-national governments are prohibited from borrowing except upon special
approval of the central government, almost all sub-national governments are circumventing
these restrictions by borrowing “off the books.” Qiao and Shah (2006) describe the channels
of local government borrowings. Examples include borrowing from local commercial banks
by enterprises controlled by sub-national governments, such as local SOEs, with local
government guarantees; establishment of new companies through collective financing by
local governments or employees of local SOEs; borrowing from pension funds,
unemployment insurance funds, or government employee salary funds; borrowing from
extra-budgetary funds, and so on. Interestingly, these sub-national borrowings are having an
equalizing effect on per capita provincial expenditures. The risk, however, is that
uncontrolled and hidden borrowing by sub-national governments may lead to
macroeconomic instability.

India’s fiscal system
India is a federal republic comprising five levels of government: the central government
(the Union), 28 states, seven union territories (the states), including the National Capital
Territory of Delhi, and three tiers of local government. In rural areas, the three tiers of local
government consist of about 610 districts (Zilla Parishads), 6,000 blocks (Samiti
Panchayats), and 250,000 villages (Gram Panchayats), and in urban areas, municipal
corporations, municipalities, and councils constitute the third-tier of local government.7
India has a parliamentary system of government in which the prime minister, as the head of
the central government and the cabinet, are chosen by the party or party coalition that wins
a majority of votes. Compared to the leader-subordinate relationship in the center-provincial
framework of China, the executive officers of the Union government of India and those of
the state governments are accountable, first, to the corresponding legislatures and, second,
to the voters, though a guiding administrative relation exists among the tiers of government.
It is the legislative power that dominates in this institutional framework.

Data were retrieved in December 2008 from http://districts.gov.in/, Government of India,
National Informatics Centre (NIC).
7
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Since its foundation in 1947 up to the early 1990s, India was a two-tier federation with a
constitutional demarcation of responsibilities and finances between the Union and the state
governments, which have separate legislative, executive, and judicial organs of governing.
Fiscal decentralization did not go beyond the state level until the 1992 constitutional
amendments granting statutory recognition to the third-tier governments in rural and urban
areas, although these local self-governing bodies existed long before 1947.
Only after 1992 did local governments gain constitutional status and federal recognition
with the 73rd and 74th Constitution amendments granting more powers and fiscal resources
to local governments and limiting state government interference in local, democratic selfgovernance. The 11th schedule of the Constitution assigns 29 expenditure items to rural
bodies, and the 12th schedule assigns 18 expenditure items to urban local bodies. However,
as Rao and Singh (1999) point out, several institutional failures—including a clear
centripetal bias in the distribution of fiscal powers, overlapping tax bases in contrast to the
separation principle of tax powers, and constitutionally endorsed taxation of inter-state
trade—have resulted in many economic distortions that may hinder genuine fiscal
decentralization and the development of a common market.
Before the 1980s, fiscal centralization dominated the national economy. Beginning in the
mid-1980s, fiscal decentralization was the focus for revitalizing the economy. Fiscal
decentralization, together with other economic reforms, has brought about high fiscal
deficits and high debts as well as large economic growth rates. The consolidated gross fiscal
deficit of the central and state governments increased from 7.4 percent of GDP in 1980 to
9.4 percent of GDP in 1990. The combined outstanding liabilities of the central and state
governments increased from 54 percent of GDP in 1984 to 67 percent in 1990. The
economic reforms initiated in the 1980s did not change the fundamental fiscal framework.
Driven by the fiscal deficit and debt crisis in the early 1990s, the Government of India
began a process of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of the economy, together
with a broadening of the tax base, compressing expenditures, and strengthening state fiscal
discipline with the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill in 2000. The new
round of economic reforms has resulted in a lower fiscal deficit to GDP ratio as well as
remarkably higher annual rates of economic growth. As a result, the combined central and
state gross fiscal deficit was reduced from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 6.7 percent of
GDP in 2005, although high outstanding liabilities remain, particularly at the state level.
The first pillar: India’s expenditure assignments
Expenditure assignments, as provided for in Article 246 of the Constitution (also known as
the Seventh Schedule), have three clear lists that specify all functions exclusively assigned
to the Union government (List I - Union List), exclusively to the state governments (List II State List), and concurrent assignments (List III - Concurrent List). Table 3 shows the
statutory expenditure assignments. The murkiness lies in the concurrent responsibilities in
List III, in which the role of the states is unclear. A large share of state revenues is used to
cover recurrent expenditures, such as administrative services, payroll, pensions, and interest
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on loans. Among total sub-national expenditures, the share devoted to non-development
expenditures increased from less than 19 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 2005. In the
meantime, over 60 percent of agricultural services and nearly 90 percent of educational,
public health, family welfare, electricity, and irrigation expenditures are shouldered by state
governments.
The second pillar: India’s revenue assignments
Table 4 summarizes India’s revenue assignments, as provided for by the three lists of the
Seventh Schedule. The most productive taxes are assigned to the Union for the purpose of
macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution. At the same time, the states are assigned a
number of tax handles. However, from the viewpoint of productivity and buoyancy, only
the sales and purchase taxes are important. Since the 80th Amendment to the Constitution
in 2000, the net proceeds of all Union taxes and duties have been changed to shared taxes
between the Union and states. Further, the 88th Amendment to the Constitution in 2003
includes taxes on services in List I as shared revenues with the states.

Table 3a: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, Union List
Main Responsibilities

Assignments

National defense and others related to intelligence & forces of the Union
Foreign affairs, foreign loans & public debts
International trade, treaties, conferences, and social order on the high seas
International civil affairs like naturalization, migration, & pilgrimages, etc.
National fiscal and monetary tools like currency, Reserve Bank of India, Post Office Savings,
Bank, lotteries, banking, insurance, stock market, future market, & other derivative markets.
National infrastructures like airways, railways, national highways, national waterways, maritime shipping
& navigation, lighthouses, ports, posts & telegraphs, telephones, wireless, broadcasting, properties of the
Union.
Interstate trade and commerce, intellectual property rights protection
Establishment of standards of weight and measure; regulation of goods to be exported abroad or interstate
Natural resources regulation, cultivation, manufacture, and sale for export of opium

List I
Union List

Coordination and standardization of higher education and research
National heritages and institutions, Union public services, All-India services, Census
Elections to Parliament and Legislatures of the states, Offices of President
Operation of the Union government, Parliament and the Union judicial organs
Audit of the accounts of the Union and the States
Interstate migration and quarantine
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List I except the Supreme Court; Any other matter not in List II
or List III

Source: Jin (2009, p. 72).
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Table 3b: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, Concurrent List
Main Responsibilities

Criminal laws & procedures about the matters not in List I & II
Transfer of property other than agricultural land; Many domestic civil laws concerning marriage, family,
and so on.
Contracting other than agricultural land; bankruptcy and insolvency, trust and trustees
Administration of justice except the Supreme Court and the High Courts
Vagrancy; nomadic, and migratory tribes; national environment, animal and plants protection
Economic and social planning including family planning; Commercial and industrial monopolies,
combines, and trusts
Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes; charities and religions
Social security and social insurance, welfare of labor; education and legal, medical, and other professions
Interstate public health; vital statistics; price control; Mechanically propelled vehicles, factories, boilers,
electricity, and publishing presses
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List III except the Supreme Court

Assignments

List III
Concurrent
List

Source: Jin (2009, p. 72).
Table 3c: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, State List
Main Responsibilities

Public order except that subject the control of the Union
Operation of State governments & local governments, the Legislatures of the states, the State judicial and
correction organs, and elections at the State level
Public goods and services such as public health & sanitation, pilgrimages, social relief, regulation of
intoxicating liquor, burials & cremations, public libraries & museums, communications not in List I,
water, land, fisheries, gas, markets & fairs, inns, sports, entertainments, gambling, incorporations other
than those in List I
Agriculture, Trade and Commerce within the State
Public debt of the State, Treasure trove
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List II except the Supreme Court

Assignments

List II
State List

Source: Jin (2009, p. 72).
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Table 4: India’s Statutory Revenue Assignments
Main tax revenues

Taxes on income other than agricultural income
Duties of customs including export duties
Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods
Corporation tax
Estate duty with respect to property other than agricultural land
Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive to agricultural land
Estate duty with respect to property other than agricultural land
Duties with respect to succession to property other than agricultural land
Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea, or air, on railway fares and
freights.
Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and future markets
letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies, and receipts
Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published
Taxes on the consignments of interstate goods trade or commerce
Taxes on services
Residuary tax powers not specified in List II and III
Fees in respect of any of the matters in List I
Recovery in a State of claims with respect to taxes and other public demands including
Stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of judicial stamps
Fees with respect to any of the matters in List III
Taxes on agricultural income
Duties with respect to succession to agricultural land
Estate duty with respect to agricultural land
Taxes on lands and buildings
Taxes on mineral rights
Duties of excise on certain goods manufactured or produced in the state
Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity
Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods except newspapers and advertisements on them
Taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in the newspapers
Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways
Taxes on vehicles, boats, and animals; tolls
Taxes on professions, trades, callings, and employment
Capitation taxes
Taxes on luxuries, entertainment, and gambling
Rates of stamp duty with respect to documents other than those specified in List I
Fees in respect of any of the matters in List II

Assignments

List IUnion List

List IIIConcurrent
List

List IIState List

Source: Jin (2009, p. 73).
The third pillar: India’s system of intergovernmental transfers
The vertical and horizontal imbalances created by the expenditure and revenue assignments
are recognized and addressed through a complex system of intergovernmental transfers.
There are several channels through which intergovernmental transfers are received by subnational governments. The first channel is the tax share in centrally levied taxes, which are
determined and transferred by the Finance Commission of the Union. The recommendations
and transfer formulas of the Finance Commission have relied heavily on per capita income
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to measure the backwardness of the recipient states. The second channel is through the
Central Planning Commission in the form of grants and loans. In general, these plan grants
and loans were initially project oriented, but they were later based on a formula known as
the Gadgil formula, which has been modified several times, with a proportionate mix of
grants and loans. These grants and loans can be roughly classified into two categories:
central assistance and additional central assistance. The third channel is through central
ministries, under which a broad range of development programs known as Centrally
Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) are initiated by the Union and implemented by various
departments of the states. The number of CSS types is estimated at over 400 and cover a
variety of development tasks like poverty alleviation, family planning, irrigation, and
education.
Among the three main components of gross devolution, shares in central taxes and central
grants follow a similar increasing trend, while loans from the Union have decreased
significantly since 2003 to less than 10 percent of total gross devolution. Because of the
pressure to lower fiscal deficits and debts, the Union cut back on loans. Grants from the
Union, non-plan schemes, CSSs, and state plan schemes account for more than 90 percent
of sub-national revenues. The multiplicity of transfer channels, together with lack of
coordination between the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission, undermines
the fiscal autonomy and fiscal discipline of sub-national governments thereby weakening
accountability.8
The fourth pillar: India’s regulation of sub-national borrowing
Sub-national borrowing is permitted in India, though with restrictions. If a sub-national
government owes money to the Union, then the sub-national government must receive
permission from the central government to borrow. Since all states have outstanding debts
to the Union, the central government has effective control over sub-national borrowing.
Besides borrowing in the form of plan loans from the Union, subnational governments can
issue domestic bonds and contract policy loans from international organizations. Since
2003, central loans have declined, and states have resorted to more market borrowings,
which involve heavy interest payments at the state level. Like China, the states of India
have substantial “off the books” and hidden borrowings through SOEs.
India’s intergovernmental fiscal system is characterized by an absence of substantial fiscal
resources available to the third-tier of local government, unclear expenditure assignments
between the central and state governments, transfer multiplicity without coordination, high
transfer dependence, and excessive sub-national borrowing.

Additionally, Bahl et al. (2005) and Heredia‐Ortiz and Rider (2005) point out several
shortcomings of transfers by the Planning Commission.

8
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Performance of China and India’s Intergovernmental Systems
Below we evaluate the performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems
using standard criteria, namely, the decentralization ratio, which is defined as the share of
sub-national government expenditures (revenues) in general government expenditures
(revenues). In addition, we calculate the average rates of expenditure and revenue
decentralization, where the average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization is the
average share of provincial (state) expenditures (revenues) in consolidated government
expenditures (revenues). This new measure accounts for the fact that countries differ in the
number of sub-national governments. Failing to account for the number of sub-national
governments can make the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization misleading.
We also examine the evolution of interregional variation in the average rates of expenditure
and revenue decentralization in China and India during the period 1985 through 2005. We
measure interregional variation in average rates of expenditure (revenue) decentralization
using the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation of the decentralization
ratio divided by the mean of the ratio, multiplied by 100.
Table 5 shows that China and India’s expenditure decentralization ratios, averaged over the
1993-2007 period, are 70.6 percent and 42.3 percent, respectively. Based on a sample of 78
countries, the time-averaged decentralization ratio of China ranks first and that of India
seventh. As a non-federal country, China’s decentralization ratio substantially exceeds the
average for federal countries of 35.5 percent. In terms of the number of government tiers,
China and India rank well above the sample average of 3.6 and the federal average of 3.8.
Figure 2 depicts the conventional measure of expenditure decentralization. In both
countries, the degree of decentralization has been growing. Over the 21 year period,
expenditure decentralization in China and India increased by 23 percent and 43 percent,
respectively. The figure also shows that China’s expenditure system is substantially more
decentralized than that of India. Keep in mind that China decentralized expenditures to local
governments; while India’s system is generally “stuck” at the state level, with some notable
exceptions. The difference in decentralization ratios between the two countries remains
relatively constant over time.
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Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007
Country 1/

OECD 2/

Federal
country 3/

Tiers 4/

Ratio
(In Percent)

0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

5
3
4
3
3
4
5
4
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
4
3
4
4
3

70.6
63.1
57.6
48.6
46.1
45.5
42.3
40.8
39.8
39.2
38.7
36.8
35.8
33.8
33.3
33.3
32.7
32.2
30.8
30.0

China 5/
Colombia
Canada
Switzerland
Denmark
United States
India 5/
Russian Federation
Argentina
Australia
Germany
Kazakhstan
Brazil
Finland
South Africa
Belarus
Sweden
Spain
Tajikistan
Norway

Country 1/

Uganda
Belgium
Romania
Albania
Peru
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
France
Serbia
Turkey
Zimbabwe
Malaysia
Slovenia
Luxembourg
Israel
Slovak Republic
Chile
Croatia
New Zealand
Portugal

OECD 2/

0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
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Federal
country 3/

Tiers 4/

Ratio
(In Percent)

0
6
20.8
1
4
20.8
0
3
19.8
0
3
19.0
0
4
17.7
0
3
17.3
0
4
16.2
0
4
15.7
0
na
14.6
0
4
13.3
0
5
13.2
1
3
12.9
0
2
12.6
0
3
11.9
0
3
11.5
0
4
10.2
0
4
9.8
0
3
9.3
0
3
8.3
0
4
8.2
(To be continued on next page)

PAGE

569
18

Jin et al.: The Evolution of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India: A C

THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE

Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007 (Continued)
Country 1/

Austria
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Mexico
Netherlands
Ethiopia
Georgia
Kyrgyz Republic
Iceland
Latvia
Italy
Lithuania
Poland
Moldova
Mongolia
Ireland
United Kingdom

PAGE

570

OECD 2/

Federal
country 3/

Tiers 4/

Ratio
(In Percent)

1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4
4
3
3
3
5
4
4
2
3
4
3
3
3
n.a.
3
4

29.1
26.5
25.7
25.3
24.9
24.1
24.1
23.9
23.6
23.1
22.7
22.6
22.6
22.4
22.3
22.2
22.1

Country 1/

Paraguay
Morocco
Armenia
El Salvador
Thailand
Mauritius
Guatemala
Greece 6/
Kenya
Fiji
Costa Rica
Iran
Cyprus
Dominican Republic
Nicaragua
Panama
Congo, Republic of

OECD 2/

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Federal
country 3/

Tiers 4/

Ratio
(In Percent)

0
3
8.1
0
3
6.3
0
3
6.2
0
3
5.9
0
5
5.6
0
3
5.4
0
4
5.1
0
4.5
4.6
0
6
4.3
0
5
3.7
0
4
3.5
0
4
3.4
0
3
3.1
0
3
3.0
0
4
2.9
0
4
2.5
0
4
2.4
(To be continued on next page)
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Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007 (Continued)
Country 1/

OECD 2/

Estonia
Bolivia
Hungary

1
0
1

Federal Tiers 4/
country 3/

0
0
0

3
4
3

Ratio
(In Percent)

21.5
21.4
21.4

Country 1/

Lesotho
Malta
Jamaica

OECD 2/

Federal Tiers 4/
country 3/

0
0
0

Overall average
OECD average
Federal average

0
0
0

Ratio
(In Percent)

3
3
2

1.7
1.2
1.0

3.6
3.4
3.8

20.8
24.5
35.5

Sources: The decentralization ratio is calculated based on data from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics. The federation dummy and
the number of government tiers are derived from Treisman (2008). The country selection is based on data availability.
Notes:
1/ Countries are ranked by their expenditure decentralization ratio, which is defined as the share of sub-national expenditures in general
government expenditures.
2/ Number of tiers including the central level.
3/ Dummy variable taking on a value of one if the country is an OECD member.
4/ Dummy variable taking on a value of one if the country is classified as Federal by Treisman (2008).
5/ Data averaged over the period 1993-2005.
6/ 4.5 because eparchies (i.e., administrative subdivisions of prefectures) exist in some prefectures.
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Figure 2: Expenditure Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent)

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.

Figure 3: Average Expenditure Decentralization in China and India, 1985-2005
(percent)
Panel (a): Unweighted
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Panel (b): Population Weighted

Panel (c): GRP Weighted

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.
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Figure 4: Coefficient of Variation in Expenditure Decentralization, 1985–2005
(percent)

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.

Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the average rate of expenditure decentralization in China and
India for the period 1985 through 2005. While India’s average rate of expenditure
decentralization is relatively stable during this period, China’s average rate of expenditure
decentralization is growing, and China is slightly more decentralized than India. Panels (b)
and (c) of the figure show population weighted and gross regional product (GRP) weighted
average rates of expenditure decentralization. According to the weighted averages, India is
slightly more decentralized than China, suggesting that the more populous and higher
income states of India are more decentralized than those of China. In addition, the weighted
averages show that China and India’s rates of expenditure decentralization are converging.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the coefficient of variation for the average rate of
expenditure decentralization in China and India between 1985 and 2005. Three patterns are
apparent in this figure. First, as suggested by the value of the coefficient of variation during
this period, which never drops below 50 in the case of China and 80 in the case of India,
there is considerable interregional variation in the rate of expenditure decentralization in
both China and India. Second, there is considerably more interregional variation in
expenditure decentralization in India relative to China. Third, the coefficient of variation in
the average rate of expenditure decentralization is trending up over time.
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Figure 5 presents the evolution of the conventional revenue decentralization ratio for the
period 1985 to 2005. In line with our earlier findings, we observe a substantial drop in
China’s revenue decentralization ratio in the first few years after the 1994 TSS reforms.
Eventually, in 2005, China’s revenue decentralization ratio settles down to a rate of 48
percent. In contrast, India’s revenue decentralization ratio has been increasing steadily from
37 percent in 1985 to 48 percent in 2005.
Figure 6 shows the average rate of revenue decentralization in China and India between
1985 and 2005. Using the unweighted average, the rates of revenue decentralization for
China and India are remarkably similar over time. Turning to the population and GRP
weighted averages, we see the same pattern as in the case of the average rate of expenditure
decentralization, namely India’s weighted-average rates of revenue decentralization are
slightly greater than those of China, but they are converging over time.
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the coefficient of variation (CV) in the average rate of
revenue decentralization for China and India between 1985 and 2005. The CV of the
average rates of revenue decentralization for China and India are remarkably similar during
this period. Likewise, there is considerable interregional variation in the rate of revenue
decentralization, and the variation appears to be trending upward in both countries over
time.
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Figure 5: Revenue Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent)

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.

Figure 6: Average Revenue Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent)
Panel (a): Unweighted

PAGE

576

2011 JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS ● WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2011

25

Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 3 [2011], Art. 32
THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE

Panel (b): Population Weighted

Panel (c): GRP Weighted

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.
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Figure 7: Coefficient of Variation in Revenue Decentralization, 1985–2005 (percent)

Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.

Conclusion
There are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and India’s
intergovernmental fiscal systems. Both countries have highly decentralized expenditures
assignments and highly centralized revenue assignments. These assignments create a
vertical fiscal gap, which can only be addressed by substantial intergovernmental transfers
leading to transfer dependency. Finally, there is considerable off the books and hidden
borrowing by sub-national governments in both countries, despite prohibitions against
borrowing without the permission of the central government.
In the case of China, the assignment of redistributive programs, like social security and
unemployment insurance, to local governments does not appear to be appropriate in the
long run, unless these assignments are accompanied by central government transfers. In the
case of India, expenditure assignments are often concurrent rather than exclusive. This
arrangement creates coordination issues and makes it difficult for citizens to know which
level of government is accountable for poor performance. We also see that there is
considerable and growing interregional variation in the rate of expenditure decentralization
in China and India. This development may point to the need for equalization transfers in
both countries; otherwise, growing interregional disparities in the quantity and quality of
local government service provision may threaten national cohesion.
The starkest difference in the fiscal systems of China and India is that expenditure
decentralization in China focuses on the third-tier of local government and skips the
second-tier of government. In contrast, India’s fiscal system is “stuck” at the second tier of

PAGE

578

2011 JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS ● WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2011

27

Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 3 [2011], Art. 32
THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE

government, with some notable exceptions like the states of West Bengal, Karnataka, and
Kerala where there has been more progress in decentralizing expenditures to local
governments.
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